Although the process of technology transfer including university-industry cooperation and other forms has been widely investigated in previous literature, it still lacks a comprehensive modeling of this process. This paper presents a model describing the selection between one-time transfer, which is usually known as patenting and licensing, and university-industry cooperation in the situation of perfect information, and find out that the bargaining power of both sides, along with the periods that the underlying technologies can be profitable are important factors that may influence the decisions of the trade forms and the corresponding fees, respectively. The simulating results show that, given the profitable period of the underlying technologies is long enough, as the bargaining power of scientists become stronger, the selection of form of trade undergoes a changing pattern of from one-time transfer to cooperation. Moreover, to deal with conflicts that the both sides may face in some cases, two rules that are proposed under the situation of with and without intermediaries are discussed respectively, and we find that the allocation under the two rules are the same. This conclusion helps providing theoretical support for introducing technology intermediaries into the process of technology transfer.
Published in | International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 5, Issue 5) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12 |
Page(s) | 235-245 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2017. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Matching Model, Technology Transfer, University-Industry Cooperation
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APA Style
Longtian Zhang, Hong Li. (2017). Selection Between One-Time Transfer and University-Industry Cooperation in Technology Transfer: A Matching Model. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 5(5), 235-245. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12
ACS Style
Longtian Zhang; Hong Li. Selection Between One-Time Transfer and University-Industry Cooperation in Technology Transfer: A Matching Model. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2017, 5(5), 235-245. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12
AMA Style
Longtian Zhang, Hong Li. Selection Between One-Time Transfer and University-Industry Cooperation in Technology Transfer: A Matching Model. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2017;5(5):235-245. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12
@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12, author = {Longtian Zhang and Hong Li}, title = {Selection Between One-Time Transfer and University-Industry Cooperation in Technology Transfer: A Matching Model}, journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences}, volume = {5}, number = {5}, pages = {235-245}, doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20170505.12}, abstract = {Although the process of technology transfer including university-industry cooperation and other forms has been widely investigated in previous literature, it still lacks a comprehensive modeling of this process. This paper presents a model describing the selection between one-time transfer, which is usually known as patenting and licensing, and university-industry cooperation in the situation of perfect information, and find out that the bargaining power of both sides, along with the periods that the underlying technologies can be profitable are important factors that may influence the decisions of the trade forms and the corresponding fees, respectively. The simulating results show that, given the profitable period of the underlying technologies is long enough, as the bargaining power of scientists become stronger, the selection of form of trade undergoes a changing pattern of from one-time transfer to cooperation. Moreover, to deal with conflicts that the both sides may face in some cases, two rules that are proposed under the situation of with and without intermediaries are discussed respectively, and we find that the allocation under the two rules are the same. This conclusion helps providing theoretical support for introducing technology intermediaries into the process of technology transfer.}, year = {2017} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Selection Between One-Time Transfer and University-Industry Cooperation in Technology Transfer: A Matching Model AU - Longtian Zhang AU - Hong Li Y1 - 2017/09/14 PY - 2017 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12 DO - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12 T2 - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JF - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JO - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences SP - 235 EP - 245 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-9561 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20170505.12 AB - Although the process of technology transfer including university-industry cooperation and other forms has been widely investigated in previous literature, it still lacks a comprehensive modeling of this process. This paper presents a model describing the selection between one-time transfer, which is usually known as patenting and licensing, and university-industry cooperation in the situation of perfect information, and find out that the bargaining power of both sides, along with the periods that the underlying technologies can be profitable are important factors that may influence the decisions of the trade forms and the corresponding fees, respectively. The simulating results show that, given the profitable period of the underlying technologies is long enough, as the bargaining power of scientists become stronger, the selection of form of trade undergoes a changing pattern of from one-time transfer to cooperation. Moreover, to deal with conflicts that the both sides may face in some cases, two rules that are proposed under the situation of with and without intermediaries are discussed respectively, and we find that the allocation under the two rules are the same. This conclusion helps providing theoretical support for introducing technology intermediaries into the process of technology transfer. VL - 5 IS - 5 ER -