Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game

Chuan Yan

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12

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Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game

Chuan Yan

Published in International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 6, Issue 2)

Received: 7 March 2018 Accepted: 21 March 2018 Published: 13 April 2018

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Abstract

Research content: Based on the framework of Chinese-style promotion game, a theoretical model to describe how local government behavior and preference affect agglomeration is made up, and empirical evidence is provided based on the samples from 282 cities in China. Innovation: Taking industrial connections as the grasp of the hand, different effects of local government behavior and preference on the agglomeration of manufacturing industry and production service industry are identified, which provides a new perspective for the explanation of the causes of agglomeration economy in China. Main conclusions: (1) In the Chinese promotion game, local government officials will promote local manufacturing industry agglomeration and producer services industry agglomeration for the maximization of their promotion profits, but prefer to promote manufacturing industry agglomeration. (2) The connection between producer services industry and manufacturing industry, and the connection within manufacturing industries will affect local governments’ industry selection preference, the former can induce local governments to tend to pull up the agglomeration of producer services industry, the latter can induce local governments to tend to pull up the manufacturing industry agglomeration.

Published in	International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 6, Issue 2)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12
Page(s)	43-53
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2018. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Promotion Game, Fiscal Decentralization, Agglomeration, Productive Service Industry, Industrial Association

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APA Style

Chuan Yan. (2018). Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 6(2), 43-53. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12

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ACS Style

Chuan Yan. Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2018, 6(2), 43-53. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12

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AMA Style

Chuan Yan. Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2018;6(2):43-53. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12,
  author = {Chuan Yan},
  title = {Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  pages = {43-53},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20180602.12},
  abstract = {Research content: Based on the framework of Chinese-style promotion game, a theoretical model to describe how local government behavior and preference affect agglomeration is made up, and empirical evidence is provided based on the samples from 282 cities in China. Innovation: Taking industrial connections as the grasp of the hand, different effects of local government behavior and preference on the agglomeration of manufacturing industry and production service industry are identified, which provides a new perspective for the explanation of the causes of agglomeration economy in China. Main conclusions: (1) In the Chinese promotion game, local government officials will promote local manufacturing industry agglomeration and producer services industry agglomeration for the maximization of their promotion profits, but prefer to promote manufacturing industry agglomeration. (2) The connection between producer services industry and manufacturing industry, and the connection within manufacturing industries will affect local governments’ industry selection preference, the former can induce local governments to tend to pull up the agglomeration of producer services industry, the latter can induce local governments to tend to pull up the manufacturing industry agglomeration.},
 year = {2018}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game
AU  - Chuan Yan
Y1  - 2018/04/13
PY  - 2018
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
SP  - 43
EP  - 53
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-9561
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12
AB  - Research content: Based on the framework of Chinese-style promotion game, a theoretical model to describe how local government behavior and preference affect agglomeration is made up, and empirical evidence is provided based on the samples from 282 cities in China. Innovation: Taking industrial connections as the grasp of the hand, different effects of local government behavior and preference on the agglomeration of manufacturing industry and production service industry are identified, which provides a new perspective for the explanation of the causes of agglomeration economy in China. Main conclusions: (1) In the Chinese promotion game, local government officials will promote local manufacturing industry agglomeration and producer services industry agglomeration for the maximization of their promotion profits, but prefer to promote manufacturing industry agglomeration. (2) The connection between producer services industry and manufacturing industry, and the connection within manufacturing industries will affect local governments’ industry selection preference, the former can induce local governments to tend to pull up the agglomeration of producer services industry, the latter can induce local governments to tend to pull up the manufacturing industry agglomeration.
VL  - 6
IS  - 2
ER  -

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Author Information

Chuan Yan

School of Public Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Chuan Yan. (2018). Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 6(2), 43-53. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12

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ACS Style

Chuan Yan. Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2018, 6(2), 43-53. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12

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AMA Style

Chuan Yan. Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2018;6(2):43-53. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12,
  author = {Chuan Yan},
  title = {Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  pages = {43-53},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20180602.12},
  abstract = {Research content: Based on the framework of Chinese-style promotion game, a theoretical model to describe how local government behavior and preference affect agglomeration is made up, and empirical evidence is provided based on the samples from 282 cities in China. Innovation: Taking industrial connections as the grasp of the hand, different effects of local government behavior and preference on the agglomeration of manufacturing industry and production service industry are identified, which provides a new perspective for the explanation of the causes of agglomeration economy in China. Main conclusions: (1) In the Chinese promotion game, local government officials will promote local manufacturing industry agglomeration and producer services industry agglomeration for the maximization of their promotion profits, but prefer to promote manufacturing industry agglomeration. (2) The connection between producer services industry and manufacturing industry, and the connection within manufacturing industries will affect local governments’ industry selection preference, the former can induce local governments to tend to pull up the agglomeration of producer services industry, the latter can induce local governments to tend to pull up the manufacturing industry agglomeration.},
 year = {2018}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Analysis of the Influence of Local Government’s Behavior and Preference on Industrial Agglomeration Under Chinese Promotion Game
AU  - Chuan Yan
Y1  - 2018/04/13
PY  - 2018
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
SP  - 43
EP  - 53
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-9561
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20180602.12
AB  - Research content: Based on the framework of Chinese-style promotion game, a theoretical model to describe how local government behavior and preference affect agglomeration is made up, and empirical evidence is provided based on the samples from 282 cities in China. Innovation: Taking industrial connections as the grasp of the hand, different effects of local government behavior and preference on the agglomeration of manufacturing industry and production service industry are identified, which provides a new perspective for the explanation of the causes of agglomeration economy in China. Main conclusions: (1) In the Chinese promotion game, local government officials will promote local manufacturing industry agglomeration and producer services industry agglomeration for the maximization of their promotion profits, but prefer to promote manufacturing industry agglomeration. (2) The connection between producer services industry and manufacturing industry, and the connection within manufacturing industries will affect local governments’ industry selection preference, the former can induce local governments to tend to pull up the agglomeration of producer services industry, the latter can induce local governments to tend to pull up the manufacturing industry agglomeration.
VL  - 6
IS  - 2
ER  -

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