The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model

Ben Liu

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11

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The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model

Ben Liu

Published in International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 9, Issue 3)

Received: 2 April 2021 Published: 24 May 2021

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Abstract

In recent years, the number and types of institutional investors in China have achieved rapid development, and gradually become an important part of China's capital market. Institutional investors pay more attention to the long-term performance of enterprises in order to maintain their long-term and stable return on investment. This paper uses the investor relationship data of the "interactive easy" platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. Furthermore, a chain-type multiple intermediary effect model is constructed to investigate investor attention affecting enterprise performance. The results show that institutional investor attention can significantly improve enterprise performance. The attention of institutional investors can reduce the quality of economic development by increasing the innovation investment of enterprises and strengthening the incentive intensity of executive compensation, as well as the chain-type intermediary channel of “Executive Compensation Incentive Increase → Enterprise innovation investment increase”, the independent intermediary effect of executive compensation incentive is the most prominent. Furthermore, the results show that institutional investor attention promotes the performance of non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises. However, the state-owned enterprises can only improve their performance through the compensation incentive independent intermediary channels.

Published in	International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 9, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11
Page(s)	97-105
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Institutional Investor Attention, Chain Intermediary Effect, Compensation Incentive, Innovation Investment, Enterprise Performance

References

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APA Style

Ben Liu. (2021). The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 9(3), 97-105. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11

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ACS Style

Ben Liu. The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2021, 9(3), 97-105. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11

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AMA Style

Ben Liu. The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2021;9(3):97-105. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11

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@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11,
  author = {Ben Liu},
  title = {The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {97-105},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20210903.11},
  abstract = {In recent years, the number and types of institutional investors in China have achieved rapid development, and gradually become an important part of China's capital market. Institutional investors pay more attention to the long-term performance of enterprises in order to maintain their long-term and stable return on investment. This paper uses the investor relationship data of the "interactive easy" platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. Furthermore, a chain-type multiple intermediary effect model is constructed to investigate investor attention affecting enterprise performance. The results show that institutional investor attention can significantly improve enterprise performance. The attention of institutional investors can reduce the quality of economic development by increasing the innovation investment of enterprises and strengthening the incentive intensity of executive compensation, as well as the chain-type intermediary channel of “Executive Compensation Incentive Increase → Enterprise innovation investment increase”, the independent intermediary effect of executive compensation incentive is the most prominent. Furthermore, the results show that institutional investor attention promotes the performance of non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises. However, the state-owned enterprises can only improve their performance through the compensation incentive independent intermediary channels.},
 year = {2021}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model
AU  - Ben Liu
Y1  - 2021/05/24
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
SP  - 97
EP  - 105
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-9561
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11
AB  - In recent years, the number and types of institutional investors in China have achieved rapid development, and gradually become an important part of China's capital market. Institutional investors pay more attention to the long-term performance of enterprises in order to maintain their long-term and stable return on investment. This paper uses the investor relationship data of the "interactive easy" platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. Furthermore, a chain-type multiple intermediary effect model is constructed to investigate investor attention affecting enterprise performance. The results show that institutional investor attention can significantly improve enterprise performance. The attention of institutional investors can reduce the quality of economic development by increasing the innovation investment of enterprises and strengthening the incentive intensity of executive compensation, as well as the chain-type intermediary channel of “Executive Compensation Incentive Increase → Enterprise innovation investment increase”, the independent intermediary effect of executive compensation incentive is the most prominent. Furthermore, the results show that institutional investor attention promotes the performance of non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises. However, the state-owned enterprises can only improve their performance through the compensation incentive independent intermediary channels.
VL  - 9
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Ben Liu

School of Shenzhen Tourism, Jinan University, Shenzhen, China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Ben Liu. (2021). The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 9(3), 97-105. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11

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ACS Style

Ben Liu. The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2021, 9(3), 97-105. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11

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AMA Style

Ben Liu. The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2021;9(3):97-105. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11,
  author = {Ben Liu},
  title = {The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {97-105},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20210903.11},
  abstract = {In recent years, the number and types of institutional investors in China have achieved rapid development, and gradually become an important part of China's capital market. Institutional investors pay more attention to the long-term performance of enterprises in order to maintain their long-term and stable return on investment. This paper uses the investor relationship data of the "interactive easy" platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. Furthermore, a chain-type multiple intermediary effect model is constructed to investigate investor attention affecting enterprise performance. The results show that institutional investor attention can significantly improve enterprise performance. The attention of institutional investors can reduce the quality of economic development by increasing the innovation investment of enterprises and strengthening the incentive intensity of executive compensation, as well as the chain-type intermediary channel of “Executive Compensation Incentive Increase → Enterprise innovation investment increase”, the independent intermediary effect of executive compensation incentive is the most prominent. Furthermore, the results show that institutional investor attention promotes the performance of non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises. However, the state-owned enterprises can only improve their performance through the compensation incentive independent intermediary channels.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Impact of Institutional Investor Attention on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Test Based on Chain Multiple Mediating Effect Model
AU  - Ben Liu
Y1  - 2021/05/24
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
SP  - 97
EP  - 105
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-9561
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20210903.11
AB  - In recent years, the number and types of institutional investors in China have achieved rapid development, and gradually become an important part of China's capital market. Institutional investors pay more attention to the long-term performance of enterprises in order to maintain their long-term and stable return on investment. This paper uses the investor relationship data of the "interactive easy" platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. Furthermore, a chain-type multiple intermediary effect model is constructed to investigate investor attention affecting enterprise performance. The results show that institutional investor attention can significantly improve enterprise performance. The attention of institutional investors can reduce the quality of economic development by increasing the innovation investment of enterprises and strengthening the incentive intensity of executive compensation, as well as the chain-type intermediary channel of “Executive Compensation Incentive Increase → Enterprise innovation investment increase”, the independent intermediary effect of executive compensation incentive is the most prominent. Furthermore, the results show that institutional investor attention promotes the performance of non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises. However, the state-owned enterprises can only improve their performance through the compensation incentive independent intermediary channels.
VL  - 9
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download