In addition to efficiency, supply chain members’ fairness concerns cannot be ignored in supply chain management. Without certain fairness, the supply chain is likely to be unstable. This paper aims to analyze the relationship between fairness and efficiency in a supply chain through an incentive contract with revenue sharing. When determining contract parameters, the contract designer (supplier) should not only focus on her own interests, but should also consider the fairness of the distribution of the supply chain profits. In this model, the fairness concerns of the retailer are reflected with a profit distribution fairness constraint. A numerical example shows that the retailer’s fairness concerns have an important impact on the efficiency of the supply chain and the distribution of supply chain profits. The supply chain’s and the retailer’s profits increase with the retailer’s fairness concerns, whereas the supplier’s profit decreases with the retailer’s fairness concerns. In both cases where the profit distribution of the supply chain is very fair and unfair, respectively, the efficiency of the supply chain may be very high. But the second situation will cause retailer dissatisfaction. This will affect the stable operation of the supply chain, and also will have a negative influence on the supplier. Therefore, the supplier should pay attention to the retailer’s fairness concerns in designing the incentive contract.
Published in | International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 10, Issue 6) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18 |
Page(s) | 368-376 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Efficiency, Fairness, Profit Distribution, Revenue Sharing Contract, Supply Chain
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APA Style
Yuming Xiao. (2022). Analysis of the Relationship Between Efficiency and Fairness in a Supply Chain. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 10(6), 368-376. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18
ACS Style
Yuming Xiao. Analysis of the Relationship Between Efficiency and Fairness in a Supply Chain. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2022, 10(6), 368-376. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18
@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18, author = {Yuming Xiao}, title = {Analysis of the Relationship Between Efficiency and Fairness in a Supply Chain}, journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences}, volume = {10}, number = {6}, pages = {368-376}, doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20221006.18}, abstract = {In addition to efficiency, supply chain members’ fairness concerns cannot be ignored in supply chain management. Without certain fairness, the supply chain is likely to be unstable. This paper aims to analyze the relationship between fairness and efficiency in a supply chain through an incentive contract with revenue sharing. When determining contract parameters, the contract designer (supplier) should not only focus on her own interests, but should also consider the fairness of the distribution of the supply chain profits. In this model, the fairness concerns of the retailer are reflected with a profit distribution fairness constraint. A numerical example shows that the retailer’s fairness concerns have an important impact on the efficiency of the supply chain and the distribution of supply chain profits. The supply chain’s and the retailer’s profits increase with the retailer’s fairness concerns, whereas the supplier’s profit decreases with the retailer’s fairness concerns. In both cases where the profit distribution of the supply chain is very fair and unfair, respectively, the efficiency of the supply chain may be very high. But the second situation will cause retailer dissatisfaction. This will affect the stable operation of the supply chain, and also will have a negative influence on the supplier. Therefore, the supplier should pay attention to the retailer’s fairness concerns in designing the incentive contract.}, year = {2022} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Analysis of the Relationship Between Efficiency and Fairness in a Supply Chain AU - Yuming Xiao Y1 - 2022/11/29 PY - 2022 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18 DO - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18 T2 - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JF - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JO - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences SP - 368 EP - 376 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-9561 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221006.18 AB - In addition to efficiency, supply chain members’ fairness concerns cannot be ignored in supply chain management. Without certain fairness, the supply chain is likely to be unstable. This paper aims to analyze the relationship between fairness and efficiency in a supply chain through an incentive contract with revenue sharing. When determining contract parameters, the contract designer (supplier) should not only focus on her own interests, but should also consider the fairness of the distribution of the supply chain profits. In this model, the fairness concerns of the retailer are reflected with a profit distribution fairness constraint. A numerical example shows that the retailer’s fairness concerns have an important impact on the efficiency of the supply chain and the distribution of supply chain profits. The supply chain’s and the retailer’s profits increase with the retailer’s fairness concerns, whereas the supplier’s profit decreases with the retailer’s fairness concerns. In both cases where the profit distribution of the supply chain is very fair and unfair, respectively, the efficiency of the supply chain may be very high. But the second situation will cause retailer dissatisfaction. This will affect the stable operation of the supply chain, and also will have a negative influence on the supplier. Therefore, the supplier should pay attention to the retailer’s fairness concerns in designing the incentive contract. VL - 10 IS - 6 ER -