The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain

Nie Qixuan; Xie Fengqin; Yu Hongfei

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain

Nie Qixuan, Xie Fengqin, Yu Hongfei

Published in International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems (Volume 8, Issue 1)

Received: 7 January 2019 Accepted: 25 February 2019 Published: 20 March 2019

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Abstract

More and more suppliers in fresh food supply chain expand online channels using fresh food e-commerce platform, forming a dual-channel supply chain model. The competition of market resources will lead to channel conflict in the dual-channel fresh food supply chain. The level of service is one of the important reasons for the conflict in the fresh food supply chain. Service is an important factor influencing the shopping decision of consumers. This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a fresh food supplier and a fresh food retailer. The supplier wholesale fresh food to the retailer while developing its own online channel. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to solve the equilibrium state of service level between the supplier and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Both the supplier and the retailer aim to maximize profits. The supplier is the game leader. It first decides the wholesale price and the service level of the online channel. The retailer is the follower. It makes decisions based on the supplier’s decisions. The study found that the supplier and the retailer can attract more customers by improving service level, thus increasing profits. Weighing the relationship between service level and operation cost is a major problem in operation.

Published in	International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems (Volume 8, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
Page(s)	6-11
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2019. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Dual-channel Supply Chain, Stackelberg Game, Service Level

References

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[5]	Xu G, Dan B, Zhang X, et al. Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 147 (1): 171-179.
[6]	Cai G, Zhang Z G, Zhang M. Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2009, 117 (1): 80-96.
[7]	Yue X, Liu J. Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2006, 174 (1): 646-667.
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[9]	Chan T Y, Narasimhan C, Yoon Y. Advertising and price competition in a manufacturer-retailer channel [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 2017: S0167811617300319.
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APA Style

Nie Qixuan, Xie Fengqin, Yu Hongfei. (2019). The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems, 8(1), 6-11. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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ACS Style

Nie Qixuan; Xie Fengqin; Yu Hongfei. The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. Int. J. Intell. Inf. Syst. 2019, 8(1), 6-11. doi: 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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AMA Style

Nie Qixuan, Xie Fengqin, Yu Hongfei. The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. Int J Intell Inf Syst. 2019;8(1):6-11. doi: 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12,
  author = {Nie Qixuan and Xie Fengqin and Yu Hongfei},
  title = {The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain},
  journal = {International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {6-11},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijiis.20190801.12},
  abstract = {More and more suppliers in fresh food supply chain expand online channels using fresh food e-commerce platform, forming a dual-channel supply chain model. The competition of market resources will lead to channel conflict in the dual-channel fresh food supply chain. The level of service is one of the important reasons for the conflict in the fresh food supply chain. Service is an important factor influencing the shopping decision of consumers. This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a fresh food supplier and a fresh food retailer. The supplier wholesale fresh food to the retailer while developing its own online channel. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to solve the equilibrium state of service level between the supplier and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Both the supplier and the retailer aim to maximize profits. The supplier is the game leader. It first decides the wholesale price and the service level of the online channel. The retailer is the follower. It makes decisions based on the supplier’s decisions. The study found that the supplier and the retailer can attract more customers by improving service level, thus increasing profits. Weighing the relationship between service level and operation cost is a major problem in operation.},
 year = {2019}
}

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TY - JOUR
T1 - The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain
AU - Nie Qixuan
AU - Xie Fengqin
AU - Yu Hongfei
Y1 - 2019/03/20
PY - 2019
N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
DO - 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
T2 - International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
JF - International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
JO - International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
SP - 6
EP - 11
PB - Science Publishing Group
SN - 2328-7683
UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
AB - More and more suppliers in fresh food supply chain expand online channels using fresh food e-commerce platform, forming a dual-channel supply chain model. The competition of market resources will lead to channel conflict in the dual-channel fresh food supply chain. The level of service is one of the important reasons for the conflict in the fresh food supply chain. Service is an important factor influencing the shopping decision of consumers. This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a fresh food supplier and a fresh food retailer. The supplier wholesale fresh food to the retailer while developing its own online channel. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to solve the equilibrium state of service level between the supplier and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Both the supplier and the retailer aim to maximize profits. The supplier is the game leader. It first decides the wholesale price and the service level of the online channel. The retailer is the follower. It makes decisions based on the supplier’s decisions. The study found that the supplier and the retailer can attract more customers by improving service level, thus increasing profits. Weighing the relationship between service level and operation cost is a major problem in operation.
VL - 8
IS - 1
ER -

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Author Information

Nie Qixuan

College of Transportation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China
Xie Fengqin

College of Transportation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China
Yu Hongfei

College of Transportation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Nie Qixuan, Xie Fengqin, Yu Hongfei. (2019). The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems, 8(1), 6-11. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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ACS Style

Nie Qixuan; Xie Fengqin; Yu Hongfei. The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. Int. J. Intell. Inf. Syst. 2019, 8(1), 6-11. doi: 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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AMA Style

Nie Qixuan, Xie Fengqin, Yu Hongfei. The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. Int J Intell Inf Syst. 2019;8(1):6-11. doi: 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12,
  author = {Nie Qixuan and Xie Fengqin and Yu Hongfei},
  title = {The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain},
  journal = {International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {6-11},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijiis.20190801.12},
  abstract = {More and more suppliers in fresh food supply chain expand online channels using fresh food e-commerce platform, forming a dual-channel supply chain model. The competition of market resources will lead to channel conflict in the dual-channel fresh food supply chain. The level of service is one of the important reasons for the conflict in the fresh food supply chain. Service is an important factor influencing the shopping decision of consumers. This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a fresh food supplier and a fresh food retailer. The supplier wholesale fresh food to the retailer while developing its own online channel. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to solve the equilibrium state of service level between the supplier and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Both the supplier and the retailer aim to maximize profits. The supplier is the game leader. It first decides the wholesale price and the service level of the online channel. The retailer is the follower. It makes decisions based on the supplier’s decisions. The study found that the supplier and the retailer can attract more customers by improving service level, thus increasing profits. Weighing the relationship between service level and operation cost is a major problem in operation.},
 year = {2019}
}

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