Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law

Oleksandr Vodiannikov

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15

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Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law

Oleksandr Vodiannikov

Published in International Journal of Law and Society (Volume 6, Issue 2)

Received: 17 March 2023 Accepted: 4 May 2023 Published: 17 May 2023

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Abstract

References to public interest are abundant in legal scholarship, jurisprudence, and legislation. However, the meaning of interest still remains rather a common sense idea without legible standards or criteria. The article offers to conceptualize it in a broader socio-historical context, as this concept cannot be treated in isolation from the evolution of the Western scientific paradigm that aspires to rationalize the world, to rationally explain and construct a cognitive map of both social and natural environments. To explore the history of “interest” in law means to grasp and reconstruct the phases of the fundamental revolution that legal thought has undergone since the mid-XVIII century. The article offers a bird-eye view of how the concept of interest gained currency and infiltrated law. This evolutionary perspective could explain certain coherence and similarity of various meanings proposed for the concept of interest in case law and scholarship. The article argues that interest becomes socially recognizable and viable when it is perceived and interpreted as such. It acquires validity in legal argumentation if it fits into the cultural schemata of legal framing. The article purports to deconstruct interest as a category. It argues that three key assumptions underpin the concept: (1) interests are social constructs; (2) interests are generated by argumentation (to qualify as interest an existing or perceived good, purpose, motive, aspiration, or claim requires argumentation that triggers “frames of interest” - cognitive representations and constructs); (3) interests are vehicles whereby normative ideas of justice, society, and the world, generated and validated by other normative orders, are adapted, legitimized and incorporated into law. The article discusses the practical implications of these assumptions. In a judicial proceeding, public interest analysis should explore the central organizing idea of a public interest argumentation against three analytical components: (1) substantive (refers to the interest analysis); (2) quantitative (refers to the “society”/ “public” analysis); and (3) qualitative (refers to analysis focusing on whether the argumentation triggers cognitive representations and constructs that reference moral principles). Finally, the reconceptualization of interest as a social construct can shed new light on legal argumentation and the so-called “five I-s of legal reasoning”: intuitiveness, incidentality, indeterminacy, ideology, and irrationality. Though indeed often intuition-driven, interest as a social construct that fits into legal framing is not incidental, indeterminate, or irrational. Incrementing and unfolding via interaction and competition with discourses and legal frames, interests bring in certainty, predictability, and determinacy to open-ended concepts of law.

Published in	International Journal of Law and Society (Volume 6, Issue 2)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15
Page(s)	144-154
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Interest, Public Interest, Interest Jurisprudence, Legal Argumentation, Frame Analysis

References

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Oleksandr Vodiannikov. (2023). Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law. International Journal of Law and Society, 6(2), 144-154. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15

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Oleksandr Vodiannikov. Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law. Int. J. Law Soc. 2023, 6(2), 144-154. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15

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Oleksandr Vodiannikov. Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law. Int J Law Soc. 2023;6(2):144-154. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15

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@article{10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15,
  author = {Oleksandr Vodiannikov},
  title = {Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law},
  journal = {International Journal of Law and Society},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  pages = {144-154},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijls.20230602.15},
  abstract = {References to public interest are abundant in legal scholarship, jurisprudence, and legislation. However, the meaning of interest still remains rather a common sense idea without legible standards or criteria. The article offers to conceptualize it in a broader socio-historical context, as this concept cannot be treated in isolation from the evolution of the Western scientific paradigm that aspires to rationalize the world, to rationally explain and construct a cognitive map of both social and natural environments. To explore the history of “interest” in law means to grasp and reconstruct the phases of the fundamental revolution that legal thought has undergone since the mid-XVIII century. The article offers a bird-eye view of how the concept of interest gained currency and infiltrated law. This evolutionary perspective could explain certain coherence and similarity of various meanings proposed for the concept of interest in case law and scholarship. The article argues that interest becomes socially recognizable and viable when it is perceived and interpreted as such. It acquires validity in legal argumentation if it fits into the cultural schemata of legal framing. The article purports to deconstruct interest as a category. It argues that three key assumptions underpin the concept: (1) interests are social constructs; (2) interests are generated by argumentation (to qualify as interest an existing or perceived good, purpose, motive, aspiration, or claim requires argumentation that triggers “frames of interest” - cognitive representations and constructs); (3) interests are vehicles whereby normative ideas of justice, society, and the world, generated and validated by other normative orders, are adapted, legitimized and incorporated into law. The article discusses the practical implications of these assumptions. In a judicial proceeding, public interest analysis should explore the central organizing idea of a public interest argumentation against three analytical components: (1) substantive (refers to the interest analysis); (2) quantitative (refers to the “society”/ “public” analysis); and (3) qualitative (refers to analysis focusing on whether the argumentation triggers cognitive representations and constructs that reference moral principles). Finally, the reconceptualization of interest as a social construct can shed new light on legal argumentation and the so-called “five I-s of legal reasoning”: intuitiveness, incidentality, indeterminacy, ideology, and irrationality. Though indeed often intuition-driven, interest as a social construct that fits into legal framing is not incidental, indeterminate, or irrational. Incrementing and unfolding via interaction and competition with discourses and legal frames, interests bring in certainty, predictability, and determinacy to open-ended concepts of law.},
 year = {2023}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law
AU  - Oleksandr Vodiannikov
Y1  - 2023/05/17
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15
T2  - International Journal of Law and Society
JF  - International Journal of Law and Society
JO  - International Journal of Law and Society
SP  - 144
EP  - 154
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-1908
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15
AB  - References to public interest are abundant in legal scholarship, jurisprudence, and legislation. However, the meaning of interest still remains rather a common sense idea without legible standards or criteria. The article offers to conceptualize it in a broader socio-historical context, as this concept cannot be treated in isolation from the evolution of the Western scientific paradigm that aspires to rationalize the world, to rationally explain and construct a cognitive map of both social and natural environments. To explore the history of “interest” in law means to grasp and reconstruct the phases of the fundamental revolution that legal thought has undergone since the mid-XVIII century. The article offers a bird-eye view of how the concept of interest gained currency and infiltrated law. This evolutionary perspective could explain certain coherence and similarity of various meanings proposed for the concept of interest in case law and scholarship. The article argues that interest becomes socially recognizable and viable when it is perceived and interpreted as such. It acquires validity in legal argumentation if it fits into the cultural schemata of legal framing. The article purports to deconstruct interest as a category. It argues that three key assumptions underpin the concept: (1) interests are social constructs; (2) interests are generated by argumentation (to qualify as interest an existing or perceived good, purpose, motive, aspiration, or claim requires argumentation that triggers “frames of interest” - cognitive representations and constructs); (3) interests are vehicles whereby normative ideas of justice, society, and the world, generated and validated by other normative orders, are adapted, legitimized and incorporated into law. The article discusses the practical implications of these assumptions. In a judicial proceeding, public interest analysis should explore the central organizing idea of a public interest argumentation against three analytical components: (1) substantive (refers to the interest analysis); (2) quantitative (refers to the “society”/ “public” analysis); and (3) qualitative (refers to analysis focusing on whether the argumentation triggers cognitive representations and constructs that reference moral principles). Finally, the reconceptualization of interest as a social construct can shed new light on legal argumentation and the so-called “five I-s of legal reasoning”: intuitiveness, incidentality, indeterminacy, ideology, and irrationality. Though indeed often intuition-driven, interest as a social construct that fits into legal framing is not incidental, indeterminate, or irrational. Incrementing and unfolding via interaction and competition with discourses and legal frames, interests bring in certainty, predictability, and determinacy to open-ended concepts of law.
VL  - 6
IS  - 2
ER  -

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Oleksandr Vodiannikov

Law Reform Commission, Kyiv, Ukraine

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Oleksandr Vodiannikov. (2023). Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law. International Journal of Law and Society, 6(2), 144-154. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15

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Oleksandr Vodiannikov. Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law. Int. J. Law Soc. 2023, 6(2), 144-154. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15

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Oleksandr Vodiannikov. Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law. Int J Law Soc. 2023;6(2):144-154. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15

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@article{10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15,
  author = {Oleksandr Vodiannikov},
  title = {Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law},
  journal = {International Journal of Law and Society},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  pages = {144-154},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijls.20230602.15},
  abstract = {References to public interest are abundant in legal scholarship, jurisprudence, and legislation. However, the meaning of interest still remains rather a common sense idea without legible standards or criteria. The article offers to conceptualize it in a broader socio-historical context, as this concept cannot be treated in isolation from the evolution of the Western scientific paradigm that aspires to rationalize the world, to rationally explain and construct a cognitive map of both social and natural environments. To explore the history of “interest” in law means to grasp and reconstruct the phases of the fundamental revolution that legal thought has undergone since the mid-XVIII century. The article offers a bird-eye view of how the concept of interest gained currency and infiltrated law. This evolutionary perspective could explain certain coherence and similarity of various meanings proposed for the concept of interest in case law and scholarship. The article argues that interest becomes socially recognizable and viable when it is perceived and interpreted as such. It acquires validity in legal argumentation if it fits into the cultural schemata of legal framing. The article purports to deconstruct interest as a category. It argues that three key assumptions underpin the concept: (1) interests are social constructs; (2) interests are generated by argumentation (to qualify as interest an existing or perceived good, purpose, motive, aspiration, or claim requires argumentation that triggers “frames of interest” - cognitive representations and constructs); (3) interests are vehicles whereby normative ideas of justice, society, and the world, generated and validated by other normative orders, are adapted, legitimized and incorporated into law. The article discusses the practical implications of these assumptions. In a judicial proceeding, public interest analysis should explore the central organizing idea of a public interest argumentation against three analytical components: (1) substantive (refers to the interest analysis); (2) quantitative (refers to the “society”/ “public” analysis); and (3) qualitative (refers to analysis focusing on whether the argumentation triggers cognitive representations and constructs that reference moral principles). Finally, the reconceptualization of interest as a social construct can shed new light on legal argumentation and the so-called “five I-s of legal reasoning”: intuitiveness, incidentality, indeterminacy, ideology, and irrationality. Though indeed often intuition-driven, interest as a social construct that fits into legal framing is not incidental, indeterminate, or irrational. Incrementing and unfolding via interaction and competition with discourses and legal frames, interests bring in certainty, predictability, and determinacy to open-ended concepts of law.},
 year = {2023}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Rationalising the Political: The Concept of Interest in Postmodern Public Law
AU  - Oleksandr Vodiannikov
Y1  - 2023/05/17
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15
T2  - International Journal of Law and Society
JF  - International Journal of Law and Society
JO  - International Journal of Law and Society
SP  - 144
EP  - 154
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-1908
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20230602.15
AB  - References to public interest are abundant in legal scholarship, jurisprudence, and legislation. However, the meaning of interest still remains rather a common sense idea without legible standards or criteria. The article offers to conceptualize it in a broader socio-historical context, as this concept cannot be treated in isolation from the evolution of the Western scientific paradigm that aspires to rationalize the world, to rationally explain and construct a cognitive map of both social and natural environments. To explore the history of “interest” in law means to grasp and reconstruct the phases of the fundamental revolution that legal thought has undergone since the mid-XVIII century. The article offers a bird-eye view of how the concept of interest gained currency and infiltrated law. This evolutionary perspective could explain certain coherence and similarity of various meanings proposed for the concept of interest in case law and scholarship. The article argues that interest becomes socially recognizable and viable when it is perceived and interpreted as such. It acquires validity in legal argumentation if it fits into the cultural schemata of legal framing. The article purports to deconstruct interest as a category. It argues that three key assumptions underpin the concept: (1) interests are social constructs; (2) interests are generated by argumentation (to qualify as interest an existing or perceived good, purpose, motive, aspiration, or claim requires argumentation that triggers “frames of interest” - cognitive representations and constructs); (3) interests are vehicles whereby normative ideas of justice, society, and the world, generated and validated by other normative orders, are adapted, legitimized and incorporated into law. The article discusses the practical implications of these assumptions. In a judicial proceeding, public interest analysis should explore the central organizing idea of a public interest argumentation against three analytical components: (1) substantive (refers to the interest analysis); (2) quantitative (refers to the “society”/ “public” analysis); and (3) qualitative (refers to analysis focusing on whether the argumentation triggers cognitive representations and constructs that reference moral principles). Finally, the reconceptualization of interest as a social construct can shed new light on legal argumentation and the so-called “five I-s of legal reasoning”: intuitiveness, incidentality, indeterminacy, ideology, and irrationality. Though indeed often intuition-driven, interest as a social construct that fits into legal framing is not incidental, indeterminate, or irrational. Incrementing and unfolding via interaction and competition with discourses and legal frames, interests bring in certainty, predictability, and determinacy to open-ended concepts of law.
VL  - 6
IS  - 2
ER  -

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