The Changes and Enlightenment of China's Power Supervision Institutions: Based on Actual Observations Since 1978
American Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics
Volume 4, Issue 2, June 2019, Pages: 65-72
Received: Mar. 2, 2019;
Published: Jun. 15, 2019
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Liu Yang, The School of Government, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, P. R. China
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China's power supervision organization has experienced a change process of re-establishment, restoration, reform and innovation since the reform and opening up in 1978. In practice, China adopts a multi-agency model of power supervision to decentralize power and restrict power. By raising the level of the rule of law in power supervision, China has achieved full coverage of the power supervision of state organs and civil servants exercising public power. Through improving the anti-corruption strategic system combining education, system and supervision, the anti-corruption work has achieved remarkable results. However, there are also problems such as the imbalance of the functions of various power supervision subjects, the lack of effective restraint mechanisms for the "top leaders" of the Party committee, and the imperfect performance evaluation system for power supervision. It is suggested that the power balance mechanism should be further improved in the future, effective measures to prevent abuse of power and corruption within power supervision institutions should be explored, the discipline inspection and supervision organs should strengthen the supervision of the party committees and "top leaders" at the same level, and a trinity power supervision performance evaluation system of corruption prevention, punishment and control should be established.
Anti - Corruption, Power Supervision, Institutional Mechanisms, Reform
To cite this article
The Changes and Enlightenment of China's Power Supervision Institutions: Based on Actual Observations Since 1978, American Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics.
Vol. 4, No. 2,
2019, pp. 65-72.
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